DOSSIER

 

Death on LPG carrier in  Antwerp engine room fire

 

The dangers of promoting crewmembers without full evidence that they have the necessary skills were highlighted in a MAIB report on the death f a third engineer in an Antwerp engine room fire in August 2020

A third engineer died from smoke inhalation after an engine room fire on liquefied petroleum gas/ ethylene carrier Moritz Schulte, in Antwerp, Belgium, in August 2020.

This is a synopsis of the full report by The UK Maritime Accident Investigation Board (MAIB). The full report can be downloaded at the link below.

The fire happened while the cargo of ethylene was being discharged.

The third engineer was working on the fuel filter of an auxiliary engine. The fuel system had not been effectively isolated.

A spray of fuel under pressure hit both the third engineer and the hot exhaust of an adjacent auxiliary engine, where it ignited.

Other crew members closed the space to limit the spread of the fire, but subsequently discovered that the third engineer was missing and had last been seen in the engine room.

The master prohibited the use of a CO2 fixed fire fighting system, in case it could inhibit breathing.

The vessel’s search and rescue team made two attempts to enter the engine room, but both were unsuccessful due to smoke and heat.

With the third attempt, staff made a ‘sweep’ of the area of the engine room where they thought the third engineer might be, but did not find him.

A shore fire team found the third engineer, an hour after the start of the fire. He was recovered ashore but died 9 days later from the effects of smoke inhalation.

The investigation found that the maintenance job was unnecessary, conducted in an unsafe way, and at an appropriate time, without any risk assessment having been done, and in the absence of any direct supervision.

It found that the vessel had a full range of safe systems of work in place.

Analysis of the third engineer‘s training programme activity log found that only two of the 65 rank-specific tasks he was required to undertake before his promotion to third engineer had been completed with the requisite evidence.

It also found that the training system permitted line management to confirm that training had been completed without evidence being provided This facilitated his promotion twice when he was not ready.

The investigation also found there was no evidence of the vessel crew having completed ‘poor visibility enclosed space rescue drills’ or ‘escape drills using Emergency Escape Breathing Devices.’

The company’s own investigation identified 32 actions relating to communication, crew and competence management, safety management and technical management.

The company has since equipped its four vessels that were built before July 2003 with additional Emergency Escape Breathing Devices.

As a result of the actions already taken, no further recommendations have been made by MAIB.

 

 

 

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